In the previous program, we discussed how the firm resistance of the popular forces in cities and the crushing reaction of the Iranian army’s air force and navy deterred the armed-to-the-teeth Ba'athist army of Saddam from achieving its goals within a few days.

The Islamic Republic’s air force by flying 140 fighter jets over Iraq displayed its prowess during “Kaman 99” operation and targeting the important economic facilities and military bases of Iraq. Iran’s navy by targeting the Iraqi oil platforms in the Persian Gulf and the war frigates dealt a fatal blow on Iraq’s oil exports from the Persian Gulf and its navy.

The response of the Iranian armed forces to the Ba'athist army was quite opposite of the intelligence offered to the Iraqi dictator Saddam. The Iraqi spying apparatus had collected broad intelligence on Iran’s internal situation with the complicity of the reactionary regional regimes, the US and the western regimes. Regarding the information given to Iraq, a Ba'athist commander writes: “Very exact information was given to Iraq of Iran's economic and political situation and the domestic problems and political clashes of opposing groups. Iraq had the most accurate details of the military condition and the collapse of the structure of the Iranian army due to the resignation of thousands of military officers. It also had full knowledge on the confusion and lack of any discipline within the military units of Iran. Saudi Arabia also informed the Iraqi regime of Iranian military power since the beginning of the victory of the Iranian revolution. The Saudis had taken the information from the US spying apparatuses. The United States had a large number of mercenaries and received information about the situation of the Iranian armed forces through some foreign embassies and via political and military personnel who escaped to Iraq. Thus, the Iraqi leaders pursued the military conditions and developments in Iran."

The only issue that was not considered by the Iraqi commanders was the spirit and strength of the resistance among the Iranian nation, which was fully ready to react after the victory of the Islamic Revolution. In fact, the basis for the Iraqi rulers' decision to launch a military strike against Iran was the assessment of the intelligence apparatus of the country; hence, the popular resistance and the repercussions of Iraq’s failure in achieving the goals set by the leaders of the regime of Saddam had been highly neglected. An Iraqi commander, analyzing the failure of the Iraqi army and reminding them that of lack of access to correct information, says about the resistance of the Iranian people: "If the commanding headquarters wanted to make a decision to attack Iran, it was necessary to provide the assailant units with very accurate information. But the information given on any likely resistance was not correct.”In the wake of false evaluations of Iran's military capability and popular resistance, Saddam declared cease-fire just a few days after the start of the war. The Iraqi dictator, in the second week of the war, addressed the Iraqi people: "Iraq has achieved its territorial goals and is willing to abandon hostilities and come to the negotiating table."

Of course, the Ba'athist army of Saddam, despite the stiff resilience of Iranian forces in many fronts, had made some progress due to the military and logistical shortages of the Iranian forces. But these developments were in no way consistent with Saddam's plan for a three-day conquest of Khuzestan as a minimal goal. In fact, Saddam's request for a ceasefire indicated the failure of his strategy of invading Iran. The US-backed Ba'athist army, despite the use of a limited strategy coupled with speed, decisiveness and surprise, failed to achieve its goals. Therefore, it was forced to be stationed at improper defensive positions. The request of a ceasefire from the Islamic Republic of Iran, while large swaths of Iran's territory were under the Iraqi occupation, was not acceptable. Saddam was plunged in the illusion that he could take concessions at the negotiating table and dismember parts of Iranian regions, in view of political, economic and security problems facing the fledgling Islamic Republic system.

In spite of all the difficulties and obstacles facing the newfound Islamic Republic of Iran, no one took Saddam's proposal seriously. If the Iraqi dictator was indeed begging for a cease-fire and the end of the war. Yet, the Islamic Republic stressed that he had to withdraw from the occupied territories and the initial claims, particularly the abolition of the 1975 Algiers Agreement. But for Saddam, it was tantamount to political suicide to withdraw from the areas that had been occupied as they could serve as levers of pressure for taking concessions from Iran. Saddam pursued a policy of maintaining the status quo to force Iran to negotiate. The regime of Saddam thought that the Islamic Republic, despite its stiff resistance vis-à-vis the aggression, lacked the ability to liberate the occupied territories due to political, security, economic and military problems, and that the stabilization of Iraq's position in the occupied territories would force Iran to give more concessions. In view of this, Saddam, stationing his armed forces in the defensive positions, made its second strategic mistake after invading the Islamic Republic of Iran. As the rainy season was approaching, the Iranian armed forces found a good opportunity without having to set up a proper position and the Ba'athist war machine failed to deal a considerable blow to the Islamic Republic's military forces. Thus, the Iranian army, IRGC and Basij forces were highly motivated to solve the problems inside the country and get ready to liberate the territories from the clutches of the occupiers. One Iraqi commander said: "The Iraqi leadership had based its views on the turbulent situation in Iran and serious differences among Iranian politicians and thought that Iran would not be able to provide enough force to expel Iraqi forces because of the internal situation."

In the next program, we will talk about the various views of the officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran on how to manage the war and the external impact of these views, especially among the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

RM/FK/SS