Welcome to the 23rd edition of this series. In the previous article, we spoke about the first major operation codenamed Samen al-A'imma in late September 1981 to break the siege of the strategic city of Abadan and liberate some of the adjacent regions.

The city of Abadan is located along the Arvand River and has the largest oil refinery in Iran. After occupying Khorramshahr after 34 days of stiff resistance, Saddam's Baathist army planned to occupy Abadan. However, with the vigilance of the armed forces and people, Saddam's armed-to-the-teeth army failed to occupy the city but all access roads to Abadan were blocked and Abadan was besieged by the invading army. The first year of Saddam's invasion was accompanied with widespread political and military developments. The country was still in turmoil in terms of politics, economy, security and military. Saddam attacked Iran while he was indulged in the wishful thinking that the unstable situation would pave the way for fast gaining of his ominous goals. Yet, thanks to the unique guidelines of Imam Khomeini, stability was restored in the country and the problems were overcome one by one especially in the field of politics. Furthermore, the Iranian nation stood firmly against all deficiencies, and the youths played a major role in disappointing and crippling the Baathist army of Saddam. In such an imbroglio, breaking the siege of the strategic city of Abadan was a landmark to liberate the occupied territories.

The outcomes of Samen al-A'imma operation shattered the enemy's false beliefs and dreams on the power of the Muslim combatants and disrupted the security of the enemy, which had long been deployed unabashedly in the occupied territories. While this operation revealed the vulnerable points of the Baathist enemy. In addition, the self-confidence of Basij (popular) forces and the armed forces to adopt innovative combat tactics as well as the cooperation between the army and the IRGC were some of the outcomes that materialized.   

Based on the achievements of Samen al-A'imma operation, the army and the IRGC commanders held meetings for the adoption of operational strategy. In concluding these meetings, 12 plans were drafted and presented to the Supreme Defence Council and later put into effect in Karbala 1 to Karbala 12 operations. Among the important points presented to the Supreme Defence Council, we can refer to taking advantage of every possibility and initiative in the war and the principle of concentration of forces. The destruction of the enemy forces and their expulsion from Islamic Iran was the second important point emphasized by the army and IRGC commanders to the members of Supreme Defence Council. Getting prepared for the critical and final attacks of the proposed operations was designed in such a way that, based on the principle of economics, the defense line needed the least force to recover immediately after the operation. In view of this, cooperation between the army and the IRGC began with a combination of forces and adoption of new operational strategy and combat tactics. The cooperation between the army and the IRGC in an atmosphere of mutual understanding led to elimination of many illusions and misleading propaganda. Nevertheless, the role of the young, creative, and selfless commanders such as Gholam Hussein Afshordi (Hassan Baqeri) should not be ignored in the design of several operations after Samen al-A'imma operation. Hassan Baqeri was one of the main designers of Samen Al-A'imma operation and, with the passage of time, his role became more prominent in the war headquarters.

Hassan Baqeri played a serious role in shaping the IRGC as a newly-established armed force. Gholamali Rashid is one of the IRGC top commanders and was a close companion of Hassan Baqeri during the years of war till his martyrdom. Regarding Baqeri’s commanding prowess, Brigadier General Gholamali Rashid says: Anyone who saw him during the first months of the war wouldn't believe that in less than one year he would be one of the most competent and most determined military commanders. After several months of his presence in the warfronts, Hassan Baqeri's military prowess and commandment capability appeared in the Operation codenamed (Commander-in-Chief, Khomeini). In the course of the operation, following the 3.5km advance of the Iranian combatants and the construction of an embankment, Hassan Baqeri led the operation due to the injury of Commander Rahim Safavi. Moreover, despite the efforts of the enemy and many counter-attacks till the 8^th day, he held the line firmly and prevented it from falling. Thus, Hassan Baqeri showed his competence and prowess in the four operations which led to the enemy's retreat from the south (operations of Samen al-A'imma, Tariq al-Quds, Fath al-Mobin and Bayt al-Moqaddas). In continuation of his memories on martyr Hassan Baqeri, Brigadier General Gholamali Rashid says: the battlefront is the place of emergence of talents. The unique talents of martyr Baqeri flourished in the war. He founded part of the major structures of the war including the intelligence and operation of the IRGC's combat structure. According to his encouraging behavior, young people such as martyr Hassan Shafi'zadeh and other commanders built various specialties in the combat structure of the IRGC. His theoretical and practical teachings also led the IRGC to grow in all dimensions. Rahim Safavi, one of the main commanders of IRGC during wartime and the former IRGC chief commander said the first feature of martyr Baqeri was his intellectual genius. Major General Rahim Safavi believes that Hassan Baqeri was not only a commander but also one of the strategists of the 8-year holy defense. Rahim Safavi adds that in formulating a strategic war against Saddam's Baathist army, martyr Hassan Baqeri had the genius of planning operations, establishment of intelligence units, mobilization of combat units and training of popular forces. Inspired with divine guidance, Hassan Baqeri won an asymmetrical war in which the other side had the state of the art weapons, equipment and facilities coupled with superior economic, political and propaganda support of all big powers; while the forces of Islam were barehanded and had no support except the grace and assistance of God.

Ali Minoo, who has researched on martyr Baqeri, writes on the personality of this great commander: Among the prominent features of martyr Baqeri was his key role in coordinating the headquarters, gauging of intelligence, pre-operation design and his strong presence in guiding the operation. All these prove the integrity of this great military figure. In major and minor operations, a commander can direct an operation successfully when he understands the enemy's strategy accurately and, by evaluation of the enemy, knows how to apply correct combination of military tactics and techniques. Thus, he acts quickly against the enemy's strategy and directs the war dynamically; that is, he is timely in the battlefield and makes the right decision in the course of the operation about the deployment of his units and those of the enemy. Martyr Baqeri says in this regard: We practiced such a warfare in six months and we learned the popular and classical principles that were combined until the major Samen al-A'imma operations began. According to Sun Tzu, the author of the book "Art of War," an able commander goes to danger on a calculated manner, but does not do it in vain. When the situation is appropriate, he takes action decisively. Martyr Baqeri was a clear example of such a commander who was able to act at the right time. For example, in Bayt ul-Moqaddas Operation, his acumen as the commander of Nasr headquarters was very determining. On the threshold of the first phase of operation, he quickly reached the conclusion that the siege of Khorramshahr at the first phase of operations was a mental act.

FK/RM/ME