Glimpses of Epic of 8-Year Holy Defense (25)
In a couple of episodes, we talked about the Samen al-A’imma operation and its great military achievements and political impacts.
Samen al-A’imma operation was one of the most successful operations for liberating occupied regions of Iran. It displayed the combat might of the army and IRGC forces and their coordination in a major operation. Samen al-A’imma operation revealed the vulnerability of the Iraqi army for Saddam and his supporters in two western and eastern blocs. With this operation, the IRGC combat structure was shaped in the form of brigade and battalion and set the ground for another great operation with organizing of Basiji forces within the framework of brigades and battalions. The IRGC was formed three months after the victory of the Islamic revolution in May 1979 and was set up in the form of centers in provinces and cities. As sinister moves of anti-revolution elements began in Kurdistan, the IRGC and popular forces set out for Kurdistan voluntarily. As the imposed war broke out, many popular forces rushed towards Ahwaz and some of those forces who were in the western fronts (like Kurdistan) came to the south. The forces who were dispatched from all over Iran to Ahwaz, first referred to the IRGC operation headquarters in the south and then were transferred to the forefront in one of the axes. This trend continued until Samen al-A’imma operation in late September 1981. In this operation, the forces of each city or province were assigned for an operation axis either alone or within regional forces.
Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei as Imam Khomeini's then representative in Supreme Defense Council, said on Samen al-A'imma operation, "Until Samen al-A’imma operation, our operations were often unsuccessful. Perhaps just one or two operations can be shown which were successful to some extent and the reason is that popular forces had not been used before Samen al-A’imma. In other words, the Basij and the IRGC had not taken part in operations, and the IRGC did not have facilities. Furthermore, the military authorities were not even willing to involve Revolutionary Guards into military action. This was one of our disputes with Bani Sadr, then commander in chief of the armed forces. It was natural that with limited forces of the army under commanders like Bani-Sadr, there was little chance of success and in practice they did not succeed.” Elsewhere, referring to the delay of liberating Khorramshahr, Ayatollah Khamenei says, "I believe that Khorramshahr was liberated one year late because the year before the IRGC was not taken seriously and the existence of the IRGC as an organization was not even imagined."
As circumstances changed, the IRGC increased its power and expanded the capacity of popular forces. Thus, within two months, the IRGC managed to provide 25 combat battalions concurrent with Samen al-A'imma operation and increased the number of its real battalions in the next operations to 32, 135 and 144 battalions respectively. The success of Samen al-A’imma operation showed that design and implementation of a broad operation with new strategy was feasible. The army and IRGC commanders reviewed new conditions and, based on this, they outlined new strategy which pursued three basic goals.
The first goal was to deal more destructive blows to the Iraqi war machine. Obtaining the right positions to reduce the lines of defense and eventually giving a shelter to our own forces against the Iraqi artillery fire to increase their power for next operations, was the second goal in the new war strategy. The third goal was to make further preparations to gradually liberate all of the occupied regions. Based on this strategy, plans were schemed for 12 consecutive operations codenamed "Karbala". These schemes were given priority due to the capacity of forces, the land position in military terms and the importance of the area for operation. Concerning the result of the efforts and planning of the 12 Karbala operations, then IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaee said: “After Samen al-A’imma operation, we entered a new era with a new strategy and it was supposed to design 12 operations namely Karbala-1 to Karbala-12. These 12 serial operations were the first systematic operation which started from one point and ended to another point and they were conducted one after another. It was clear when each operation would be carried out and it had even been given a name.”
After extensive discussions between the army and IRGC commanders, Tariq al- Quds operation codenamed Ya Hossein started simultaneously in several axes with the goal of liberating Bostan city and reaching the border lines in Chazzabeh border. In this operation whose designer was martyr Hassan Baqeri, 23 IRGC battalions and 9 army battalions began fighting 60 armed-to-the-teeth battalions of the Iraqi Baathist army. The main feature of Tariq al-Quds operation was to cross the impassible lands in the north of the battlefield and quite surprise the enemy. The resounding and quick success of Iranian forces in the northern axis shook the position of the Iraqi forces deployed in the southern axis. Thus, the Iranian combatants gained great victory. The creative and innovative youths in each operation stunned the enemy with new initiatives and dealt heavy blows on the Ba'athist army. These brave and selfless youths entered the operation exactly from where the enemy would never imagine. They crossed through apparently arduous natural hindrances and impassible manmade obstacles. Saddam and his arrogant army would never think that the Iranian combatants would ever dare to cross the sand lands at night, but the Iranian forces including the IRGC, the Basij and the army crossed the area and penetrated into Saddam's defensive lines. The surprise attacks of the Iranian combatants petrified the Iraqi army to the extent that they would raise their hands in big numbers and surrender to the Iranian forces. The operations of Iranian forces during the 8-year US-imposed war were a matter of surprise for all military experts in the west and were even added to the courses of military academies to be taught as examples of modern warfare. In the next program we will tell you more about Tariq al-Quds operation.
RM/SS