Welcome to another episode of this series. In the previous program, we discussed the second great operation Tariq al-Quds.

Tariq al-Quds operation was carried out two months after the successful Samen al-A’imma operation which broke the siege of Abadan. By changing the strategy of war in the second year of Saddam's invasion of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s territory, Iraq was in a defensive position on Iran's offensive stance. With the end of Tariq al-Quds operation, Iran put on its agenda to carry out further operations to prevent re-organization and strengthening of the enemy's morale. In this situation, when the Iranian forces took the initiative in the war and behind the battlefront, the two regions, namely, west of Dezful and west of Karun river attracted the attention of the military commanders of the Islamic Republic of Iran and one of them had to be appointed to perform the operation. After a long discussion, the commanders of the Army and IRGC proposed the west Dezful region for future major operations. Eventually, the IRGC proposed area was selected for Fat'h al-Mobin operation for reasons such as the conformity of its own units with the size of the area and the way the region's natural conditions fitted to the Army capabilities.

After two major successful operations and the liberation of large parts of Iran from the occupation of the Iraqi Ba'ath army, political and security conditions were firmly established in the country. On the eve of Fat'h al-Mobin operation, the process of the country’s political developments was improving and it was completely different from the circumstances during Samen al-A’imma operation. The MKO terrorist grouplet lost major part of its structure and part of its central cadre after the successive blows. And other anti-revolutionary groups that had begun an all-out struggle to take power were effectively annihilated. The process of military development also changed in favor of Iran, in view of the deteriorating status of the Ba'athist enemy after Tariq al-Quds operation and the defeat in the Chazzabeh Strait. Saddam's Ba’athist regime, worried about the circumstances, made a secret proposal to end the war. The demand for peace that the Ba'athist regime had proposed for long to save itself was again raised as Fat'h al-Mobin operation began and the impacts of the victory of the Muslim combatants emerged. Thus, in order to save Saddam and put an end to the war, extensive efforts were made by the Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries Committee, the Goodwill Committee of the Islamic Conference, the Islamic Conference Organization, as well as several political-religious figures of the Islamic world.

In this case, quoting the Britain-based Lewis Mill publication, daily Washington Post wrote on March 18, 1982: "Iraq has secretly proposed withdrawing its forces from Iran and paying financial compensation, provided that Iran grants concessions, including the cancellation of its request to form a delegation to determine who initiated the war." The cancelation of the request for determining the invader in fact meant legitimizing Saddam’s invasion on the Islamic Republic and there was no guarantee to prevent Saddam from repeated invasion. Thus, the Islamic Republic emphasized on introducing the invader in any peace resolution or plan.

  Fat'h al-Mobin operation started on March 22, 1982. This operation was considered among the innovations of the clever and self-sacrificing Iranian youth at that juncture in time. Several factors were involved in designing this operation. The main determining indicator was how to disperse the enemy in the region. The Iraqi army was forced to make improper defensive lines when entering Iran due to failure in reaching its pre-planned targets. Hence, in the first stages of operation, the enemy's front was shaken due to the collapse of a number of units, and as a result, Iranian forces would achieve their goals more quickly. Fat'h al-Mobin operation was carried out in 4 stages. The successive carrying out of the operation phases was another feature of it. Any delay in materializing of the second phase, in addition to losing the achievements of the first phase, could lead the entire operation to failure. But the implementation of the second phase of the operation and the capture of Roqabiyeh strait led to the collapse of Iraqi forces and consequently their escape due to fear of being captured and destroyed. The IRGC which was responsible for command and guidance of the Basij popular forces, gradually expanded its structure in terms of quality and quantity in accordance with the needs of the front. The system of waging popular warfare in Samen al- A’imma and Tariq al-Quds operations was initially developed and expanded in Fat'h al-Mobin operation with major changes. The IRGC significantly expanded its structure to 12 brigades ready to enter the field; while in Tariq al-Quds operation only four brigades entered the arena. Moreover, the IRGC for the first time formed a joint command with the army from the highest command rank to the lowest combat units. The merger of forces and the formation of joint headquarters with the army were implemented in good condition. Furthermore, completing the capacities and strength and removing weak points of the forces was an important point in this integration.

Another feature of Fat'h al-Mobin operation was that Basij forces took part unprecedentedly and spirituality deeply ruled the battlefronts. The unpredicted presence of Basij forces should be considered one of the reasons for the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the IRGC’s combat forces in this operation. The Ba’athist enemy, which had made various efforts to delay the execution of Fat'h al- Mobin operation, surrendering to the overwhelming presence of Iranian combatants, was defeated and fled the battlefield just to save its life. The number of enemy captives and booties that were obtained was indicative of the magnitude of success of the operation, despair and destruction of the Ba'athist units and the military superiority of the Islamic Republic of Iran. William F. Heckman, the US Navy Commander and member of the federal board of directors of the Brookings Foreign Studies Program, said on the issue: "The triumphs of Iran represented a renewed armed force, more manpower and better coordination between the army and the IRGC."

One of the military experts, with a deep look at Fat'h al-Mobin operation, described the withdrawal of Saddam's army to behind the borders the consequence of the operation, saying: “Fat'h al-Mobin operation inflicted the worst defeat on Iraq since the beginning of the war. This assault led to the withdrawal of Iraq on all fronts along the Iranian-Iraqi border and the destruction of three Iraqi divisions."

RM/SS