If you remember, in reviewing the major events of the 8-year US-imposed war against the Islamic Republic through its puppet Saddam of Ba'athist regime, we discussed the 4th great operation in the beginning of the 5th month of 1982 some twenty months after the outbreak of the war.

This honorable operation was codenamed as Bayt ul-Moqaddas. In a timespan of just 7 months, it was the 4^th operation and was schemed to liberate some of the occupied regions in southwest of Iran especially the highly strategic port city of Khorramshahr. Bayt ul-Moqaddas was the largest operation since the beginning of the invasion by the Iraqi Ba'athist army. Besides, it was a major change in political and military equations. After the collapse of Khorramshahr, a military official at the US Department of War (Pentagon) said: "Our relationship with Iraq was not just an ordinary exchange of information. We would give Iraq whatever it wanted to defeat Iran."

Immediately after the end of Fat’h al- Mobin operation in late March 1982 a joint meeting was held with the presence of the experienced commanders of IRGC and the army and all units were informed of reorganizing and strengthening themselves within two weeks for a new operation. Due to the accurate understanding and thorough analysis of high ranking commanders from the current situation and the urgency to launch new operations, a special endeavor was made to accelerate the trend of victories. Because any procrastination, in view of the coming of the hot season in the southwest region and the alertness of the enemy, might lead to deterring efforts or counterattacks by the invading army of Saddam. Lack of information about the conditions of the time would give to a waste of opportunities. This, in turn would ensue irreparable consequences. Meanwhile, the psychological bewilderment caused by the epic Fat’h al-Mobin operation had dropped the enemy at a critical situation. Hence, the sooner another operation was staged, the more it would shock the enemy and make any chance of reorganizing and restoring power impossible for the enemy. Regarding the cause of the hurry to launch Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation, Martyr Hassan Baqeri, one of the great strategists and brave commanders of Iran, stated, "The reaction of Iraq was that it was looking for a narrow line along the asphalt road and in a distance of about 7 to 8 kilometers west of Karun River, it arranged tanks in all directions."  

The operational area of Bayt ul-Moqaddas had special circumstances due to the land features and the deployment of the Ba'athist army which made the operation harder. One of the features of Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation was the Karun River, the largest river in Iran. After the war 4 large dams have been constructed on the river. For this reason, the Iraqi Ba'athist commanders did not imagine that the Iranian young strategists would choose the toughest route for operation. But the Iranian commanders would always consider one main principle for operation, and that was the principle of surprise. Thus, during the great Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation which lasted for 22 days, the Iranian commanders set the principle of surprise as the basis of decisions for a successful operation. But there were differences of opinion among the commanders of the IRGC and the Islamic Republic army on how to stage Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation. In general, two methods were proposed by the IRGC and army commanders for carrying out Bayt ul-Muqoddas operation. The first one was to attack the enemy with reliance on Ahwaz-Khorramshahr road through Navard region of Ahwaz and second was to cross Karun River for reaching Ahwaz-Khorramshahr road. Each solution had its own advantages and disadvantages, which in total the plan of crossing the Karun River was agreed upon by the commanders and military designers.

Among the disadvantages of the second proposed method was the difficulty of crossing the Karun River and installing the bridge. However, reducing the distance to reach the targets in the depths of the enemy positions and the weakness of the Iraqi resistance in this area was an advantage of the proposal. The first proposal was precisely based on classical thinking and principle of warfare.

The first method was very natural as it seemed more convenient in view of the fact that the Iranians had just staged an operation and looked too tired to launch a surprise method and try an untried scheme. The proposal made by the IRGC designers to cross the Karun River was accepted because it was based on the creativity and innovation of popular forces. It was beyond the classical thinking of the enemy. The then IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei said: "Experienced, trained and skilled military experts said the Iranians could not cross the Karun River, and the main effort should be focused on the Ahwaz-Khorramshahr road." As far as crossing the Karun River, an official working with martyr Hassan Baqeri said: "Crossing a river is itself one of the most difficult operations that many armies engage in long exercises to be able to put it into effect. We just did whatever we could. There were two kinds of bridges. The PMP bridge was related to the military engineering and the one placed on the water was a GSP bridge and within ten minutes it would be possible to cross it and return.”

The Iraqi Ba'athist army was fully aware of the successive operations of the Iranian forces but did not know how they were going to be conducted. For this reason, the enemy bolstered its defense lines and military fortifications by any means. The Ba'athist forces began immediately after the Fat’h al-Mobin operation to destroy the residential areas of Khorramshahr so that the sound of explosions could be heard incessantly in the east of the Karun River. The Iraqis built fortifications around and in the city, lay a large number of landmines and put a vast array of ammunition to deter Iranian troops from entering the city from the north and east. The enemy also made special engineering efforts to confront the Iranian forces and to avoid civil war. The Ba'athist army intended to turn Khorramshahr into a robust and impenetrable fortress, so that it may be able to prevent its recapture. The enemy, in spite of enjoying the privileges of a vaster area as well as superior fortresses against Muslim combatants, faced many difficulties and hurdles. It failed to defend the vast territory and was in shortage of adequate manpower.

RM/SS