In the previous program we talked about the scheming and staging of the epic Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation. Bayt ul-Moqaddas operational region was the last region that the Ba'athist enemy had occupied.

This region is a plain straddling between Ahwaz and Khorramshahr cities to the Iran and Iraq borders. Bayt ul-Moqaddas operational region was surrounded by natural obstacles such as rivers and Hur al-Howeizeh marshlands. It was also limited to international border. In the north of the operational region, the Nissan River extends to Karkheh Kur River. In the east, there is the wide Karun River. From the south, it reaches Arvand River, and the west also ends in Hur al-Howeizeh. In some parts, where there is no river or natural obstacle, at the beginning of the invasion of Iran by the Ba'athist regime created artificial flood on the Iranian side to prevent further advancement of the Ba'athists to Ahwaz. After Fat’h al-Mobin operation, the Iraqi further widened the areas under flood to strengthen these obstacles. Under such conditions, the flood was a major natural barrier to prevent the advance of the Iranian forces. The Ba'athist enemy’s units were stationed behind these natural barriers and large rivers. Such a situation was one of the requirements for operational planning to attack the positions of Saddam's army and cross the two natural and water obstacles.

One year and a half after the outbreak of war, the Iranian forces had gathered a great deal of experience in fighting and crossing natural and artificial barriers. In the ups and downs of the warfare, the strength and weakness of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s forces and the Ba'athist army were revealed. The successful staging of three epic operations and the liberation of thousands of square kilometers of the areas from the clutches of the Baathist forces was an indicative of putting into practice the experience of more than a year of fighting with the invading forces. During the great Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation, the Iranian forces were at the peak of their efficiency to exploit the experiences of the previous operations. Saddam's army was also watchful about the new tactics of the brave young forces of the Islamic Republic, and gradually made changes in the lines of defense, deployment of force on the battlefronts and the use of reserve forces.

Mo'inian, head of the Nasr Headquarters Intelligence Center and one of the martyrs of the holy defense said: “Iraq hatched a plot for Khorramshahr similar to that of Israel for the Suez Canal. Thus, the enemy strengthened the Karun River in full protection in order to prevent the crossing of Muslim combatants from the river into Khorramshahr." Before the beginning of Bayt ul-Moqaddas Operation, the enemy forces had been stationed in the region for about 20 months. Thus, they had ample time to build fortifications and barricades and create artificial barriers such as several minefields and putting coiled and line barbed wire in different parts of the region.

Therefore, to prepare a good plan for the operation, it was necessary for the Iranian commanders to cross these natural and artificial barriers simultaneously. The Iraqi Ba'athist army was sure that the next Iranian operational region would be on the south of Ahwaz for liberation of Khorramshahr. Saddam's army, with the help of the Soviet MIG-25 fighters, regularly took aerial photograph and with air reconnaissance operation obtained the required information from the positions and centers of gathering of Iranian forces. According to the intelligence officials of the Iraqi army, it was very easy to follow the movements of Iranian regular forces, because the Iranian army brigades usually used military vehicles for transportation and telecommunications equipment as well as commanding activities as much as they could. While access to information about the movement of the popular (Basiji) forces was difficult, because they used non-military vehicles and other devices. The Iraqi army’s intelligence sector had identified the main core of danger. Therefore, they provided armored personnel carriers to deal with any sort of operation.

A total of about 10 armored brigades, 5 mechanized brigades, 17 infantry brigades, 7 commando battalions and units of the Iraqi army had been stationed against Islamic combatants in Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation. Of course, these units were not present at the same time in the operational area, but gradually they converged there and were stationed at various fronts of the operational area and were used by Saddam's army. It can be said that, in this region, the enemy had about 41 armored battalions, 38 mechanized battalions, each with a total of 34 tanks or personnel carriers, and 40 infantry battalions and 30 artillery battalions. Altogether, about 2,700 tanks and personnel carriers, and 40,000 infantry forces and 500 artillery shells were deployed by Ba'athist invaders in this area.

The Iraqi army’s third division had taken the most important defensive considerations for Khorramshahr and held the city with full strength. The Iraqi army had projected a 180-degree defense from the east and north of the city with numerous defensive lines. The Ba'athist army had created a defensive line for its forces by destroying some residential houses on the eastern and northern parts of Khorramshahr. Resistance in Khorramshahr and preservation of this city at any cost were the main strategies of the command of the Ba'athist 3rd division. Making sure of Iran's plan to liberate Khorramshahr, the Iraqi army began launching barracks and installing vertical barriers in the customs field two weeks before the start of Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation to confront Iran's heliborne deployment of forces. A brief look at the stationing of Iraqi forces with a huge amount of equipment and natural and artificial barriers highlights the great job of the Iranian selfless youths to go through these barriers deep into the enemy lines which led to the liberation of Khorramshahr.

RM/SS