In the previous programs we talked about the resistance and withstanding of military and popular forces against the Iraqi Ba'ath minority regime’s invasion of Iran.

Saddam did not imagine such resistance against his armed-to-the-teeth army. The Iraqi dictator thought of occupation of Iran’s oil-rich province of Khuzestan within 3 days. But only on the front of Khorramshahr, the defenders of the city checked for 34 days the army of Saddam which was armed and equipped with the sophisticated weapons of the day. Seeing stiff steadfastness, Saddam proposed a cease-fire to achieve his minimum objective of lifting the 1975 Algiers Agreement. The proposal was not taken serious by any Iranian official despite the occupation of large swaths of Iran’s territory. Hence, Saddam, in order to take concession, pinned hope on the internal differences of Iran and stabilized the Iraqi positions in the occupied parts of Iran. William F. Hickman, the US navy commander and member of the board of directors of Brookings Foreign Studies Program says: “In the second phase of the war which was from November 1 1980 till the summer of 1981, on one hand, the war reached a deadlock during which the Iraqi forces were deployed in defensive positions and on the other hand, Iran’s efforts to regulate the affairs of the fronts did not succeed because of the power struggle in Tehran." Yet, Iraq's failure to impose its desires and the inability of the Islamic Republic to retake the occupied regions led to a war of attrition.

In view of the instability of Iran's political condition and the circumstances at the war theaters, the basic question is: What was the state of the Islamic Republic between the invasion and liberation of the occupied territories? In other words, what was the political-military condition of the country, and what were the consequences, what was the enemy's perception and belief on all this? Prior to the victory of the Islamic Revolution, in view of the goal shared by all groups to overthrow the Shah, the differences among these groups were less obvious. But there is no doubt that the Islamic Revolution was led by the honorable source of emulation and great scholar, Imam Khomeini (God's mercy upon him) and the main engine to drive the Islamic Republic was the grassroots movement of the Muslim people of Iran and other currents and groups were just benefiting from the popular movement. The struggles of all opposing currents were overshadowed by the gargantuan movement led by Imam Khomeini. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, as long as the political groups did not adopt an armed encounter against the nascent Islamic Republic, they enjoyed freedom of speech and activity and had a strong presence in the first round of parliamentary and presidential elections. But the groups affiliated to the left and communist bloc gradually revealed their hostility to the Islamic Revolution. The occupation of the American Embassy by Muslim students in late 1980 and the disclosure of a large amount of documents on schemes to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran helped to reveal the true identity of many individuals and political movements which were trying to topple the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, the US embassy in Tehran was rightly called as den of espionage by Imam Khomeini. Disclosing the identity of some individuals affiliated to these anti-revolutionary groups which had penetrated into some sensitive sections of the Islamic Republic system further revealed the behind-the-scene activities of the US and its mercenaries inside the country.

The occupation of the US den of espionage in Tehran has caused all anti-revolutionary currents and elements to multiply and buttress their efforts in a coordinated and organized encounter with the revolutionary forces. The nature of these currents and the political and military objectives they pursued led to their alignment with US efforts and policies to overthrow the newly established Islamic Republic. In the course of internal developments, the election of Bani Sadr to presidency was a turning point in the coherence and organization of the elements and currents which were in pursuit of annihilating the Islamic Revolution. Bani Sadr was the person who in the last months leading up to the victory of the Islamic Revolution managed to approach Imam Khomeini's friends and companions during several months of residence in France in a bid to gain legitimacy and repute. This made him win in the first presidential election in early 1980. But his thoughts and approaches were far from Imam Khomeini’s viewpoints. With his victory in the presidential elections, Bani Sadr thought that he was able, through popular sentiments in the first year of victory of the Islamic Revolution, to put his thoughts and objectives into effect by distancing from Imam Khomeini and the objectives and ideals of the Islamic Revolution. Bani Sadr was seeking to eliminate the revolutionary forces who were formed after the occupation of the US den of espionage. But the developments of the war and the new conditions of followers and lovers of Imam Khomeini in the country and battlefields made it difficult for Bani-Sadr to fulfill his political goals. Bani Sadr thought that, with the chaotic military circumstances and his position as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he could push aside or at least marginalize the revolutionary forces loyal to Imam Khomeini.

The basic changes and reforms in the country’s political-military structure after the victory of the revolution and its natural consequences led to disorder among military forces in the aftermath of political instability.

Casting doubt and ambiguity on the raison d'être of the army and the efforts aimed at suspending military procurement contracts, and in particular, the counter-revolutionary elements severely weakened the position of the army with the slogan of dissolution of the army. Along with these disruptions, counter-revolutionary forces in some areas, like the border regions of Gonbad, Kurdistan, Khuzestan, Baluchistan, embarked on instigation of crisis and killing people and forces loyal to the Islamic Revolution. These disorders in the army and the engagement of the revolutionary forces against separatists and opponents of the Islamic Revolution plunged Saddam in the illusion that, with the stabilization of the positions of his army in the occupied territories, he would be able to overthrow the Islamic Republic, or at least gain concessions from the Islamic Republic and separate part of the Iranian soil.

FK/RM/SS