In the previous program, we spoke about the consequences of setback of Hovieza operation and martyrdom of Seyyed Hussein Alam-al Hoda and more than 100 of his companions to prevent the collapse of the small city of Hoveiza.

We said that, unlike the Iraqi Baathist regime, the Islamic Republic could not rely on armored forces to carry out operations and liberate the regions under occupation. We also spoke about the disharmony between the IRGC and the army to launch a cooperation and the need for dividing these two armed forces' functions. About two months after the last unsuccessful operation in Hoveiza, the IRGC forces carried out limited operation in the name of Imam Mahdi in Susangerd yielding a considerable success the spiritual fruits of which were more important than material results. Despite the small size, the victory of the operation highly strengthened the morale of the combatants in those difficult conditions of war when thousands of kilometers of the Iranian soil were under the Iraqi occupation.

About 200 IRGC and Basiji forces took part in Susangerd operation. As the duties of the IRGC and the Islamic Republic's Army had been determined, it was decided that the army's artillery would provide fire for 10 minutes. The operation began at 7:30 am. The surprise attack on the enemy and rapid advance of forces, led to the destruction of part of the armored and mechanized forces of the enemy and the killing of 100 and captivity of 68 of them. What made this operation very momentous in that particular politico-military situation was the emergence of belief in breaking the political and military deadlock of the war. Victory in Imam Mahdi operation broke the political and military impasse of the war in favor of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The creativity and initiative of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and the Popular Forces (Basij) led to the creation of a new war tactic against the enemy. In fact, the results of limited operations around Susangerd region with the codename of Imam Mahdi indicate that the breaking of military deadlock is possible only with a revolutionary spirit free from ordinary methods. The popular forces and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, using revolutionary tactics based on limited facilities and surprise attack at night, organized and launched a new set of operations.

After Imam Mahdi operation on March 17, 1981 until the operation of breaking the siege of Abadan on September 27, 1981, several limited operations were successfully carried out mainly in Khuzestan region. But these operations were very limited compared with the size of the occupied territories. These operations were aimed at hitting the enemy, and the forces returned to the forefronts after the operation. It took one year and a half to make the enemy bogged-down in the occupied territories and then liberate these areas with the start of massive assaults by devoted combatants. During this period, the continued presence of occupying forces in the occupied regions was based on the assumption that the Islamic Republic military forces lack the required capability for driving them out of the occupied regions. In this regard, an official of the armed forces joint chiefs of staff Gholamali Rashid said: The enemy spent a year on our soil without any successful offensive on our side. This indulged the enemy in the illusion that we lacked the power of launching an offensive and were not able to retake the occupied lands from them.

The enemies of the Islamic Republic had pinned their hopes on the unstable situation inside the country so that they thought the effects of domestic instability would undermine the Islamic Republic to the extent that it wouldn't be able to organize a proper military arrangement. Meanwhile, Iraqis officially announced their willingness to cooperate with internal anti-revolutionary groups. In December 1980, New York Times wrote: The Iraqi president Saddam has proposed, in an attempt to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini, to have unconditional cooperation with each of the 'opposition groups' in Iran.

In the previous programs, we pointed out that as the monarchial system was collapsing in Iran, various political groups got in the train of the Islamic Revolution. After the victory of the Revolution, various political figures, whose political and ideological views were very different from those of Imam Khomeini, yet they had ambitions for power and high office; tried to get closer to the Imam. One of these people was Abul Hassan Bani Sadr. He spent his higher studies in economy in France and got close to Imam Khomeini in Paris. He came to Iran with Imam Khomeini. Soon, he rose to higher ranks of the Islamic system. Bani Sadr, as a candidate near to the supporters of Imam Khomeini, took part in February 1980 presidential campaigns and was elected as the first Iranian president with a majority vote. Bani Sadr’s victory in the country’s presidential elections plunged Iran into political turmoil and a chain of crises.

Taking the post of commander in chief of the armed forces, Bani Sadr was indulged in the illusion that he could do anything he desired due to the high number of votes to him. This is while he owed his credit from the kind supports of Imam Khomeini as people were getting more and more disappointed with him. Thus, Bani Sadr gradually separated himself from the ranks of the masses of the people who loved Imam Khomeini; and he got close to the enemies of the Islamic Republic.

Every meeting with the presence of Bani Sadr was the hub of those who opposed Imam Khomeini’s path for creating a government on the basis of Islamic teachings and set up of popular system. Bani Sadr during his 14-month presidency created a separate rank against the revolutionary forces and Imam Khomeini. Thus, the forces of the country were arrayed in opposite sides. These events took place at the time when the country had faced an all-out land and air invasion of Saddam's army since late September 1980. Consequently, the battlefields against the Baathist army were affected by the political imbroglio of the country, although in some limited operations in the occupied territories of Khuzestan, the army, the IRGC and Basij forces succeeded in blocking the enemy's advancement.

But so long as Bani Sadr was in power no spectacular development was made on the battle scenes. The link between Bani Sadr and the anti-revolutionary currents such as the MKO terrorist organization assured everyone that he was trying his best to marginalize Imam Khomeini and his followers and masquerade as the hero of all the achievements of the revolution. Bani Sadr was seeking to attract the support of the western regimes. Therefore, in June 1981 Imam Khomeini dismissed Bani Sadr from the post of commander in chief of the armed forces. A week later, Bani Sadr together with the MKO leader Masoud Rajavi fled to France in female disguise. The dismissal of Bani Sadr was a turning point in the history of the Islamic Revolution and the imposed war. Bani Sadr’s escape from the country occurred in the 9^th month of Saddam’s invasion of Iran.

FK/RM/SS