In the previous episode, we talked about one of the most important events in the first year of the 8-year imposed war.

 It was Samen al-A’imma operation which led to breaking of the siege of the strategic city of Abadan. With this operation, a fundamental development took place in the process of confronting the Baathist regime. Samen al-A’imma Operation was conducted under conditions of political turmoil after the massive assassination of high-ranking political, judicial and security officials of the country by the MKO. The head of the terrorist organization Masoud Rajavi, after fleeing to Paris along with the ousted president Bani Sadr, in an interview with Time magazine said: “Khomeini is very weak. He has lost 90% of his leadership. People are really happy and congratulate us. Now we are on the line of attack and Khomeini is on the line of defense.”

The Iraqi dictator Saddam was delighted with the illusions of the fugitive anti-revolutionaries in Paris that the Islamic Republic of Iran has come to its end. What the anti-revolutionaries and Saddam and his supporters were unaware of in the two western and eastern blocs, were the spirit of courage, self-sacrifice, genius and creativity of the Iranian youths that would alter every political and military equation. One of these youths was the 24-year-old commander, Hassan Baqeri, who designed the plan for Samen al-A’imma operation by identifying the exact positions of the enemy. Then he took command of one of the four axes to break the Abadan siege. The full success of Samen al-A’imma operation had broad political and military consequences inside Iran and was reflected widely in the world.

Reviewing the resounding victory of the Iranian combatants during Samen al-A'imma operation, British state-run Radio London said: "The victory of Iran is not just a military but a political retreat for Saddam." Later, Anthony H. Cordesman, American expert on military issues, stressed that the proposal for a one-month ceasefire in Iraq in November 1981 was due to Iran's victory in Abadan in October 1981. Cordesman wrote in his book: "Iran's victory in the Abadan front revealed the fact that superiority in armored and air power could be meaningless. In addition, Iran's victory in Abadan was a warning to the west. Even western forces, who are likely to be more efficient than Iraqi forces in the use of air power and heavy weapons, faced the problem that Iraq faces in Abadan in confronting Iran's forces. Especially that western governments are politically not prepared to accept heavy casualties in a low-level war." The American military expert noted the formation of a new type of warfare whose starting point could be the breaking of Abadan's siege. He continued: "It's not yet clear how Iranians achieved this victory."

The victory in Samen al-A’imma operation set the ground for materializing the strategy of war with the aim of liberating the occupied territories. In the meantime, the events of battlefronts changed the course of political developments. In other words, the political developments which had already affected the battlefields were affected by military successes. The leader of the Islamic Revolution, Imam Khomeini (God's mercy upon him) ably directed several moves along these developments. After the assassination and martyrdom of then president Mohammad Ali Rajai, Imam Khomeini described the presidential election as vital for the Islamic Republic and termed the people's turnout on the scene to be essential and determining. In a meeting with military commanders, after the crash of a military aircraft and martyrdom of some of the commanders on board, the Imam said: "Look at the elections, you'll find that Iran will remain stable. They can stage a coup or attack when the nation is not on the scene, but what could they do when the nation is on the scene. It was understood in this war that the nation is not indifferent. Our nation and our army are strong and can keep the country well. "

After the successful completion of Samen al-A’imma operation, 5 high-ranking commanders of the army and IRGC set out for Tehran to present their report to Imam Khomeini. Nearly 17 miles from Tehran's Mehrabad Airport the aircraft crashed for an uncertain cause as all four engines ceased to function simultaneously. The pilot tried to land the plane in the same area. The aircraft's wheels were opened manually and the plane landed on an uneven ground and stopped after running for 270 meters, and the left wing hit the ground. Finally, the plane caught fire and 49 passengers including 5 top commanders were martyred. Deputy Commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Major General Fallahi, Defence Minister Brigadier General Seyed Musa Namjoo, advisor to Major General Fallahi Brigadier General Fakouri, Deputy of IRGC Commander-in-Chief Yousef Kolahdouz and the IRGC Commander of Khorramshahr Mohammad Ali Jahanara were among the martyrs of the crashed aircraft.

  Despite the great tragedy, the success of Samen al-A’imma operation was still at the top of the war news both inside Iran and abroad. Imam Khomeini assessed people's massive and decisive turnout in presidential election and the electing of Ayatollah Khamenei to presidency as a transition from instability to a new phase. In response to the commanders’ telegram on the victory in Samen al-A’imma operation, the Imam issued a message that outlined the roadmap and policy of the military forces. Expressing hope, the Imam stated, "The noble nation will soon see the last phase of victory with pushing out the aggressive faithless forces from our lands.”

Through explicating the strategy of war, the effects of political-military developments gradually appeared in the military arena. On one hand, with the increase of popular forces in the battlefields, the IRGC made new efforts to expand the organization of warfare and mobilization of these volunteer forces, and on the other hand, the Army and the IRGC provided a strategy for liberation of the occupied lands. The former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaee said, "Two basic tasks were done, one in operation and another one in organization. As for the operation, planning was carried out dynamically, that is, a military strategy was shaped. But in terms of organization, the IRGC sought to provide a combat organization and mobilization of itself."

These two were the developments after Samen al-A’imma operation. Adopting the principle that the forces should be doubled in every operation, the IRGC had planned an appropriate organization. In Samen al-A’imma operation, the IRGC forces came into action in battalion, and the concept of the brigade was formed just after the operation. According to the IRGC's emphasis on manpower, new brigades were built. In this way, the expansion of the IRGC and the promotion of its units from battalion to brigade, added to Iran's military might, and this was an effective role in the war strategy and designing a series of subsequent operations.

RM/SS