Welcome to another edition of this series. In the previous program we talked about the achievements of Fat’h al-Mobin operation, the third great operation which was carried out in the second year of the imposed war.

The achievements of Fat’h al-Mobin operation were more strategic and important than Samen al-A’imma and Tariq al-Quds operations. This operation revealed to the regime of Saddam and his supporters in the two western and eastern blocs a change in the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran from defensive to offensive as well as in the balance in favor of the Islamic Republic of Iran. That's why a financial and military aid poured into Iraq. A number of Arab regimes such as Egypt, Jordan and Sudan, with no ability to extend financial and arms aid to Iraq, sent troops to the country. Among the captives of the Ba'athist army, there were a large number of Arab nationals from different countries. Fat’h al-Mobin operation had spectacular impacts inside Iran. Alongside broad victories in the battlefields which started from the 4^th quarter of 1981 and culminated in Fat’h al-Mobin operation, Iran’s political and military situation entered a new phase. As a result, the big wave of crimes by MKO terrorists was slowed down and broad efforts were made to annihilate the remnants of anti-revolutionaries inside Iran, which had an important role in defeating the MKO terrorists at this stage. The brave efforts of IRGC and Islamic Committees forces for establishing security in Tehran broke the horror atmosphere that the MKO terrorists had created through a wave of organized assassinations. Thus, the team houses of the MKO terrorists were exposed and many ploys of major operations were pinned in the bud.

The staging of operations on team houses which was carried out several times in March and April 1982 killed some of the key members of the MKO including Musa Khiyabani the second person of the terrorist grouplet and Ashraf Rabiee the wife of Rajavi and one of the effective members of this grouplet. Therefore, the MKO, which described the Islamic Republic as a powerless system with no intelligence apparatus and operation capability, was petrified by crushing operations against its team houses in Tehran and other cities, and immediately took its members out of Iran. The defeat and escape of the united front of anti-revolutionaries dampened the US hopes on moving power in Iran and overthrowing the Islamic Republic system. The growing military victories of Iran’s armed forces intensified concerns of the US and its western partners-in-crime about prospects of regional developments. For the anti-revolutionaries both inside and outside Iran, it became clear that the popular foundations of the Islamic Republic were so strong that it could not be overthrown with the assassination of the country’s high-ranking officials or military offensive. The MKO received the coup de grace by the Iranian popular vigilance and the intelligence and security forces. As per the enlightenments of Imam Khomeini, every Iranian individual acted as an element of intelligent service to identify MKO agents and team houses. In the battlefield, it was the magnificent presence of people from all walks of life and all age groups that changed the balance of war in the second year. Fat’h al-Mobin operation was the largest operation in terms of presence of popular forces since the beginning of war in September 1980.

A review of the internal and regional political events, the enemy’s situation after Fat’h al-Mobin operation and consequences of Iran's victory till the beginning of Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation on April 30, 1982 dispalyed a better picture of Iran's general condition in foreign media. The Ba'athist enemy, after one year of being in defensive position, lost its command control against the Islamic Republic’s military strategy in different regions. As a result, in spite of having the power, equipment and facilities in different operation theaters, the demoralized forces of Saddam were not able to use their power. Moreover, the Iraqi forces had weakened so much so that they would prefer to escape, retreat or surrender during counter-attacks. The other problem of the Ba'athist army at this stage of the war was the lack of reserve forces. Due to adoption of broad goals and the assignment of missions to all their units, after being defeated, they had to expand all their capabilities into defensive positions, though to no avail. This led the enemy to have no effective reserve forces and, in essential cases, did not show a proper response to the attacks of the Iranian Muslim combatants. One of the IRGC commanders, Gholamali Rashid, says: "The enemy's situation was such that almost everywhere it had occupied, it would deploy part of its forces in that area due to the vital nature of the area. Hence, when we were fighting the enemy in the Samen al-A’imma operation area, we were certain that the Iraqi 10^th armored division and the 1^st mechanized division would not fight us in that area. "

The Ba'athist military structure broke down in the aftermath of the operation of the Iranian combatants, to the extent that in Samen al-A’imma operation, the Iraqi third armored division, and the units under its command, which had been stationed in the region after the occupation of Khorramshahr and the siege of Abadan, were subjected to offensive and vehemently destroyed. During Tariq al-Quds operation, the remaining 9^th armored division of Saddam's army was destroyed, and the 26^th armored brigade and several other units were also destroyed. Furthermore, during Fat’h al-Mobin operation, in addition to 10 armored units and 1 mechanized division of Iraq, the forces already deployed in the area and the forces that had been gathered from other areas and dispatched to the region were annihilated. On the whole, before Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation, a large part of the enemy's forces and equipment were destroyed and many of its forces were taken captive and a great deal of its facilities were captured. Therefore, the enemy was at the risk of immediate collapse on the verge of Bayt ul-Moqaddas operation. In addition to creating big concern for the rulers of Baghdad, this issue was not hidden from the regional and international supporters and accomplices of Iraq. In short, it made them review the course of war and think of new strategies to confront the Islamic Republic via different ways.

RM/SS