In the previous article we discussed the necessity of changing the operational area in view of the weak points of the Iraqi army. The Ba'athist army had a strong armored unit and a massive firepower thanks to the wide support of the two superpowers in the then west and east and their satellites.

Whenever Saddam's army was defeated in an operation, it was immediately equipped with more advanced weapons offered to the regime by its backers in the west and the east. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran was in severe bottleneck to provide the simplest munitions for its infantry units. Under such circumstances, the most important strong point of the Iranian forces was the Basij; those brave popular forces who would surprise the enemy at night combat. Under these conditions, the commanders chose the wetland area for the next operation. Wetland is a region generally at sea level, in some places the water level is two to three meters above sea level. As the area is densely covered with reeds and other plants, any movement in such places is possible only via special vehicles such as rafts and boats through waterways.

The Iraqi Ba'athist army couldn't manage to attack the wetland area. The region was strategically important in some ways. The southern and northern Majnun islands were located there with oil reserves and installations. The Iranian commanders intended to reach the road to Basra and Al-Amara with operations in wetland and capturing Majnun islands. There were two basic strategies to create an initiative in the war. The first strategy was to continue the war until the fall of Saddam, and the second strategy was to capture an important region such as Basra to force Saddam and its supporters to abide by Iran's legal demands.

 Speaker of the Majles, Hojjatol Islam Hashemi Rafsanjani, in the gathering of a number of commanders, said before starting of the Kheibar operation in the wetland region: "If we carry out a successful operation inside Iraqi territory and capture a region with which to pressure Iraq to accept our right, we must agree with the cease-fire. This region can be the same, and as we have nothing yet, it is not appropriate; but if this goal is achieved, it can be raised with the Imam."

Hashemi Rafsanjani went on to say that if you succeed in this operation and conquer the Basra-Amara road, we will end the war. In fact, the main effort of the Iranian commanders and officials was concentrated on a major and successful operation that would pressure the Iraqi regime to abide by the rightful demands of the Islamic Republic. The Kheibar operation was planned to meet this need.

Kheibar was the most important operation after the Ramadan operation. It was planned and implemented in Khuzestan province and in the east and north of Basra. The operation began on February 22, 1984 with the codename (Ya Rasoullallah). The outstanding feature of this operation was the mobilization of more than 200 combat brigades and 500 boats. During the preparations for the operation, the transfer of part of the assaulting forces was anticipated to be carried out via 80 helicopters, but only 23 helicopters were used. In order to keep the secrecy of the operation, Imam Khomeini, then president Ayatollah Khamenei and a few IRGC high commanders knew of the operation plan three months before its launching.

Kheibar operation was quite different from the previous ones. Both the combat area, organization of the units and the warfare involved in the operation were considered as a new initiative for the Iranian brave forces. In order to carry out this operation, the IRGC units converted their forces into amphibian units within two months, and each took 50 to100 boats, and provided training for landing and moving in the wetland. Meanwhile, air force pilots and navy forces practiced night flight exercises in Gavkhooni swamps in the south of Isfahan province. The problem with the helicopters was that they were not equipped with night vision cameras, and they had to get used to flying at night.

Kheibar operation opened a new field for a strike against the Ba'athist forces in an unexpected area of the battlefront. It can be said that the plan for Kheibar operation was a response to the tactical deadlock that had been created during the imposed war, the impasse that actually started from the Ramadan operation. Since the enemy had armed the entire lands in the battlefield through special engineering methods, Hur ul-Hoveizeh was taken into consideration as a region for the Iranian infantry to fight the Ba'athist enemy. Before Kheibar operation, the Ba'athist army, with the help of some European countries like Germany, was equipped with internationally banned arms such as chemical weapons, and started gassing the Iranian forces since the start of Kheibar operation. The chemical attacks of Iraqi army against Iranian fronts caused no concern for the United Nations and other defenders of human rights in the US and Europe.

The main purpose of Kheibar operation was to capture the Basra- Al-Amara road in the vicinity of al-Qarneh to Al-Azir villages to disconnect the 3rd and 4th divisions of the Ba'athist army, to be stationed on the eastern shore of the Tigris River and to open a front in the northern province of Basra. Furthermore, the seizure of the two northern and southern Majnun islands, as well as full control over the vast Hur ul-Hoveizeh marshland, were the other objectives of the operation. Capturing the area could provide Iran the upper hand to meet its demands and end the war while its rights were fulfilled. The domination over Majnun oilfield could also be a guarantee of war compensation. Kheibar operation was mainly launched in the area stretching from Hur ul-Hoveizeh to the road of Basra Al-Amara on Iraqi territory, and from Talaiyeh to the wetland in Iran with an area of as vast as 1180 square kilometers. In Hur ul-Azim, which was located in Iraq, there were two oil islands called Majnun, with a total area of 160 square kilometers, with 50 oil wells. The Iraqi regime had dried up the region and turned it into island to extract oil from it. In the next program we will talk about the achievements of this operation. 

FK/ME