Glimpses of Epic of 8-Year Holy Defense (20)
In the previous program, we spoke about the chaotic political and economic situation in the first year of the US-imposed war on Iran through its stooge Saddam.
As the first Iranian president Abul Hassan Bani Sadr continued to oppose the ideals of the Islamic Revolution and get closer to and conspire with the enemies of the Revolution, especially the MKO, Imam Khomeini dismissed Bani Sadr as commander in chief of the armed forces. One day after the issuance of the Imam's commandment, the Majlis (parliament) approved Bani Sadr’s political incompetence. Bani Sadr and his supporters and the internal and external enemies of the Islamic system did not think that the initiative was in the hands of Imam Khomeini. Thus, as the enemies were pumping the propaganda that the removal of Bani-Sadr would not be possible and the Iranian army would support him, Imam Khomeini dismissed him and gave the responsibility of armed forces temporarily to General Valiollah Fallahi, commander of the ground forces of Iranian Army.
The Iranian army showed its full commitment to the Imam and the Islamic system despite all evil claims. As Bani Sadr was dismissed from both his posts, Iran faced with a new threat. After his escape from the country with the MKO ringleader Masoud Rajavi to France, the MKO terrorist outfit switched its activities to armed fight against the Islamic Republic and murdering of officials and innocent people from all walks of life. Just one week after the scandalous escape of Bani Sadr and his bosom friend Rajavi from the country, the MKO terrorists martyred 72 devoted companions of Imam Khomeini on May 27 in a dastardly act of exploding the building of Islamic Republic Party. Among these martyrs there were great personalities such as the judiciary chief, Ayatollah Beheshti and a big number of legislators and political figures.
Two months after the event, in another terrorist action in August 1981, the Iranian president Mohammad Ali Rajaei and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar attained martyrdom as a result of a terrorist blast in their office. During these two months and after, the MKO terrorists martyred hundreds of political, military and security officials and the ordinary people of Iran. The martyrdom of top officials made the enemies, including Saddam, hopeful of overthrowing of the system. Thus Iraq failed to understand the strength of the Islamic system and the power of Imam Khomeini’s leadership in critical situations. With the turn of events in the aftermath of assassination of top officials and ordinary people by the MKO, the country’s political atmosphere was totally changed. Solidarity and national unity prevailed Iran and people became the main sources of information and intelligence for identifying the MKO agents and team houses. Concurrent with the elimination of MKO terrorists and the liberalists from Iran’s political scene, the ground was paved for the fresh presence of people in the political arena.
As political stability was going to be further maintained in Iran and solidarity was getting stronger among various strata of people and officials, the ground was paved for more presence of Basij forces in the battlefields. Hence, the spiritual culture on the battlefields and military victories boosted the morale and resistance of the popular forces against the enemy. This led to spectacular victories in the battlefields. Accordingly, Imam Khomeini referred to this development as Fat'h ul-Fotuh (conquest of conquests), saying, "What is the source of boasting and honor for me is the great morale, faithful hearts and martyrdom-seeking spirit of these dear ones who are the real soldiers of Imam Zaman. It may be unique in the world and perhaps we cannot find the like of it throughout history, that youngsters, men, women, elderly women, brides and grooms all converge at the warfronts and the scene of war is a scene where the nation is present."
Following the broad presence of people at warfronts in less than a year, in the 4 major operations of Samen ul-A'imah, Tariq ul-Quds, Fat'h ul-Mobin and Bayt ul-Moqaddas, 57% of the territories were liberated from the Iraqi occupation. These victories highly horrified the enemy so that Saddam's panicked army was no more capable of launching fresh attacks. Thus, at the end of the four major operations, out of 13,600 sq. km., which were under occupation till the beginning of the second year of the war, 8,600 sq. km. were liberated and 2500 sq. km. were evacuated; but 2,500 sq. km. - including strategic border areas as well as Mehran and Naftshahr cities – were still under occupation of the Ba'athist army.
The start of Samen ul-A'imah operation, was the start of an extraordinary development in war as a new strategy was manifested with the joint operations carried out by the IRGC and army forces. As per the new strategy, for each of the two armed forces special functions were defined in accordance with their efficiency and capabilities. In addition, the IRGC’s combat organization was promoted from the rank of battalion to division. The IRGC forces, who had just the experience of irregular wars, were equipped merely with light weapons. With the outbreak of the war, however, independent battalions were formed and then combined with other battalions and formed independent brigades. By increasing the capacity of the brigades, divisions were formed. Along with the expansion of the military organization of IRGC, artillery and armored units were shaped from the booties captured from the enemy. The IRGC established its armored unit with a tank that had been captured during the operation dubbed as Commander of Armed Forces. This unit participated in Samen ul-A'imah operation with the same tank. This trend was pursued so rapidly that during Fat'h ul-Mobin operation, the major IRGC brigades such as the 8th Najaf Ashraf Brigade, the 14th Imam Hussein Brigade and the 25th Karbala Brigade had an armored battalion.
The expansion of the IRGC was significant from another aspect. The desire of the Basij popular forces to take part in the war required a proper organization to take charge of their recruitment and training in a way that the cultural fabric of this organization was also in accordance with popular forces. Therefore, the IRGC, as a product of the revolution and the people, took over the responsibility of recruiting, training and equipping of popular forces known as Basij. As people rushed towards the battlefronts, the IRGC combat organization was expanded. With the development of the IRGC, the broad use of revolutionary forces was provided and, with the expansion of the organization, the growth rate of the IRGC increased. Thus, from operation Samen ul-A'imah to operation Bayt ul-Moqaddas, their number increased from 5,000 to 60,000. In the operation Samen ul-A'imah/16 battalions, in the operation Tariq ul-Quds/23 battalions, in the operation Fath al-Mobin/100 battalions and in the operation Bayt ul-Moqaddas/112 IRGC and Basij battalions entered the arena of combat. During operation Samen ul-A'imah, which was the first major operation after the start of the war for breaking the siege of Abadan, a bitter incident occurred. A number of IRGC and army commanders were martyred in an air incident on September30, 1981 while returning from the operation zone.
The passengers of the plane were Commander of ground forces Major General Valliollah Fallahi, commander of the air force Brigadier General Javad Fakouri, Defence Minister Major General Musa Namjoo, commander of IRGC in Khorramshahr Mohammad Ali Jahanara and Yusef Kolahdouz, who was one of the founders of IRGC. The martyrdom of the senior army and IRGC commanders led to a deep spiritual link among the armed forces. The new trend was accelerated by adopting the strategy relying on the morale of revolutionary forces and their ability to organize them. At this stage, the existing reality based on creativity and initiative, along with the expertise and equipment of the Islamic Republic's Army, had a profound impact on the situation of warfronts and tilted them to Iran's benefit.
RM/SS