In the previous episode we talked about the epic of resistance of people in the small city of Hoveiza against Saddam’s army and referred to the resistance of Seyyed Hussein Alam Al-Hoda and 120 of his companions till the last moment of their life.

Hoveiza battle is one of the main chapters in the history of 8-year holy defense. Hovieza is a familiar name for all generations after the glorious Islamic revolution and few are among Iranians who have not heard the name of Hovieza. Hoveiza is a place where the leader of the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, in the gathering of the region’s tribes, on the memorial of Hovieza martyrs on December 11, 1996 said: today the dome, grave and spiritual apparatus is a means for attracting hearts to the ultimate power of the Lord of the universe.  Throughout the war is full of dream adventuress the most prominent of them is the group of Hovieza martyrs.

Hovieza operations met with failure and the city was collapsed with the martyrdom of Alam Al-Hoda and over one hundred of his companions, but the failure had achievements for continuing confrontation with the Baathist army and changing the war tactics. Hovieza operation was the confrontation between two equal but asymmetric strategies of Iran and Iraq classical armies. The operation started with the confrontation between two armored forces and is the vastest war of tanks after October war between Egyptians and the army of the Israeli regime.

After Hovieza operation and occupation of the city by the Iraqi forces and the defeat of the enemy in effort to occupy Susangerd, recession dominated over the fronts. Nobody knows what to do. The method of armored attack on the day and the war between the two regular armies did not come to an end. Armored war for the Islamic Republic of Iran was not possible due to high casualties and Iran’s inability in replacing the new equipment with the worn-out equipment due to enforcement of economic sanctions by arms-producing countries. Instead Iraq could purchase advanced weapons without any financial or political limits. In such a situation, the repetition of the regular war between the two armies using armored vehicles meant accepting Iraq's supremacy and welcoming the defeat

Hoveiza operation at that time created a fundamental change and provided a solution to this problem. After this operation, the revolutionary forces were gradually organized in the form of IRGC and Bassij. They saw the necessary military training and used the sweet and bitter experiences of the war. The people's war strategy, relying on volunteers' faith and commitment, overcame the shortage of equipment and regular armored fighting. The IRGC recovered their way and with tremendous experiences, expanded their organization and tried to develop it. Its first outcome was obtained two months later with the implementation of the limited Imam Mahdi operation in Susangerd. This limited operation created the belief that the revolutionary forces can put end to political-military deadlock of war and with creativity and initiative confront the enemy’s war machine.  Officials in Iran concluded that solving problems of war is possible only by revolutionary methods and beyond classical ways. Thus, a new phase began, during which the popular forces and the IRGC, using revolutionary spirit-based methods and tactics, took on a heavier responsibility on the battlefields.

The IRGC organization expanded and recruited many self-sacrificed youths, many of whom experienced fighting the monarchic regime. Academic forces, due to their high studies and personal talents showed more creativity and quickly commanded the forces that had never before seen any military academy and had no experience of war. In fact, they started the military experience with each other. Of course, educated people took these steps more quickly. It goes without saying that the rapid reception of experiences and training, along with the spirit of the aspiration was very influential in this process. The other influence of operations such as Hoveiza  was on the development of revolutionary forces, the IRGC and their relationship with the Islamic Republic of Iran’s army. The experience of the revolutionary forces in Hoveiza operation revealed their role in the war and paved the ground for their growth to find their deserving place. The IRGC forces quickly acquired the necessary experience and initiated major operations first jointly with the army and then alone.

The relationship between the IRGC and the army on the battlefields is one of the issues that influenced Hoveiza epic and its consequences. In the course of Bani Sadr's command and the bitter experience of IRGC participation in Hoveiza operation, separated them from each other and led the IRGC to independent operation. The Revolutionary Guards commanders found that the implementation of Hoveiza Operation and the combination of forces without the necessary coordination had many negative consequences. So, they sought to collect equipment to act independently. In the later stages of the war, cooperation between the army and the IRGC was not a simple combination, but rather a division of tasks, a separate function, or the support of part of the army for the operation of the IRGC. One of the reasons for the defeat of Hoveiza operations was the adoption of a regular and armored war strategy in that period.

In addition to influencing the military and political levels of the internal fronts, Hoveiza operation also affected the military situation of the enemy and its assessment of the internal fronts. The defeat of the Iraqi army on the first day of the operation revealed the widespread vulnerability of the Iraqis in the occupied territories. Although they were able to drive back the Iranian forces during the counter-attack the next day and regain the areas that were lost in the first phase, they were not able to advance further. In fact, the regular forces of the two sides reached a balance and tacitly accepted it. Iraqi forces concluded that the Islamic Republic of Iran lacked the ability to design and execute basic offensive operations.  One Iraqi commander, in this regard, said: "We thought that Iranian forces were incapable of carrying out precise and planned operations at a broader level, and that's why we emphasized our position. We received this mentality from the failure of Iranian forces on 5/1/1981 in Hoveizeh. But the Ba'athist regime's army was no longer able to advance after Hoveiza operation. Although they did not take defensive position during this period, they did not make significant progress and could not develop their early victories. In this way, Saddam's Ba'athist regime, along with limited military efforts, seeks to use the privileges earned to achieve a victorious peace. At the same time, it declared a readiness for a long-term war of attrition and the continued occupation of parts of Iran, and, in practice, also provided its preparations.

Thus Hoveiza operation was effective in three areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s military, its political power and Iraq’s military strategy. As a result of Hoveiza operation, the deadlock of classical and armored fighting revealed and the popular and revolutionary warfare strategy was well established, and the IRGC, by recruiting more forces and facilities, expanded its combat and took on more commitments on the battlefield.  

FK/RM/MG