Welcome to another edition of this series. In the previous program, we talked about the developments after dismissal of Bani Sadr from the posts of presidency and commander in chief of the armed forces.

When Bani Sadr's covert relationship with the enemies was revealed, no option remained for the great leader of the Islamic Revolution Imam Khomeini except removing him from his post. The developments after his fall further revealed his links with the enemies of the Islamic Revolution. After Bani Sadr’s escape, several bouts of blasts caused the martyrdom of scores of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s top officials. Then judiciary chief Ayatollah Beheshti, President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar were the top martyrs of those dastardly acts. Quite to the chagrin of enemies of the Islamic Revolution, these assassinations created no rift in the various institutions of the Islamic Republic system but increased unity and national solidarity among people and the country’s officials. The martyrdom of great figures of the revolution led to the spiritual growth of the people and increased their presence in battlefronts. The presence of combatants with high morale caused major victories in the war theaters. During the command of Bani Sadr, the armed forces especially the IRGC were deprived of equipment and facilities and faced a lot of hardships. In the aftermath of removal of Bani Sadr, the IRGC increased its might and embarked on applying popular forces to push forward the goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In a short time, the IRGC managed to form four organizational brigades each with 8 to 12 operational battalions.

After elimination of Bani Sadr, the ground was paved for serious and sincere cooperation between the army and other armed forces especially Basij popular forces. As a result of this cooperation, Samen ul-Aimmah operation was carried out after approval by the Supreme Defense Council. During this operation, close cooperation between the army and the IRGC started with a new combination of forces and adoption of a new operational strategy and tactics. Samen ul-Aimah operation started at 1 am on September 27, 1981 with the codename “Nasrun min Allah wa Fat'hun Qarib” and after two days of courageous endeavour, the selfless combatants obtained all of their goals especially breaking the siege of Abadan. Thus the historical command of Imam Khomeini (God's mercy upon him) on breaking the siege of Abadan materialized. The resistance which the Iraqi forces showed in some of their operational axes revealed their relative awareness of the operation. But, the incorrect recognition of Iraqi military commanders of the Iranian armed forces' might and their underestimating of the Iranian side failed the Iraqi army to react to the Iranian forces' assaults. In this operation, in addition to liberation of the occupied region in the east of Karun River, a notable part of Iran's military forces came out of the siege and were prepared for next operations. Liberation of 150 square kilometers of the occupied regions including the two strategic roads of Ahwaz-Abadan and Mahshahr-Abadan and breaking the siege of Abadan, captivity of 1,800 of enemy forces, killing and injury of nearly 2000 of Iraqi forces, destruction of 90 tanks and personnel carriers, taking as booty of 100 tanks and 60 carriers, 3 lift trucks and 150 vehicles and downing of three planes and one helicopter were among the achievements of Samen ul-Aimah. Failure in this operation was so costly for Saddam that after the defeat of the Baathist forces, he ordered the execution of 7 commanders.

Although Samen ul-Aimah operation was one of the 4 major and prominent operations for liberating the occupied regions, this operation was a “turning point” and “middle ring” for transferring the war strategy to the new situation. The then IRGC commander Mohsen Rezaei said in this regard: Samen ul-Aimah operation was a turning point and the beginning of the second phase of war strategy and one of the points of self-confidence in the second strategy.

 The breaking of the siege of Abadan, and the successes of Samen ul-Aimah operation had various consequences which can be evaluated in two main internal and external axes. As for the internal aspect, successful implementation of first major operation on the warfronts enhanced the morale of the combatant forces to continue to fight the enemy with more spirit and strength. After the operation Samen ul-Aimah, Iran's political circumstances became more consistent and, less than a week after the operation, people participated in the presidential election and chose Ayatollah Khamenei as the third president of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the martyrdom of Mohammad Ali Rajaee. With the political stability and unanimity of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s officials, timely stances were adopted firmly on foreign affairs. Among the external consequences of Samen ul-Aimah operation was the formation of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council by the Persian Gulf Sheikhdoms to prevent spread and influence of the Islamic Revolution and assist the Iraqi aggressive regime. Also, US military movements in the Persian Gulf increased with the aim of intensifying pressure on Islamic Iran and supporting the reactionary regimes in the region. Dispatching its military fleet to the Gulf of Oman, the US conducted certain exercises and launched a massive propaganda campaign against Iran and intensified the regional regimes’ fear of Iran. At the Arab summit in Amman, Saddam claimed that he didn't not want to make conquests; and that he just wanted to keep Iran’s threat away from his own cities. This, while Saddam invaded Iran on September 22 1980 with the aim of conquering Khuzestan in three days and overthrowing the newly-established system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

RM/SS