Iran–Israel 12-day war: Who paid heavier price? + Images

Pars Today — At around 3:15 a.m. local time on June 13, 2025, multiple explosions rocked Tehran.

Attacks that were merely the spark for launching a complex operation against Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. The Israeli regime’s air force, alongside internal sabotage elements equipped with suicide drones and anti-armor weapons, initially suppressed part of Iran’s air defense network in the northwestern provinces, clearing a path toward the capital. By around 6:30 a.m., more than 200 fighter jets, in five successive waves, had struck dozens of targets across Iran. Over the following 12 days, the Israeli regime’s air attacks continued, totaling some 1,500 sorties.

Attacks carried out as part of a broad operational plan known as “Rising Lion.” In response, Iran launched the largest and most concentrated wave of ballistic missile strikes to date. The daily firing of dozens of projectiles—amounting to more than 500 ballistic missiles over this short period—upended the Israeli side’s prior assessments.

In the view of many observers, a direct confrontation between Iran and the Israeli regime had become inevitable—especially after the events of October 7, which repeatedly brought the two sides to the brink of conflict. This trajectory was reflected in two Iranian missile and drone operations dubbed “True Promise I” (April 13, 2024) and “True Promise II” (October 1, 2024). However, the culmination of this escalating standoff came with the 12-day war.

The groundwork for this operation began when the Israeli regime, on two separate occasions, targeted components of four Iranian S-300 air defense batteries in Isfahan and Tehran. Just a few months before the operation, two early-warning radar sites near the Iraqi border were struck following True Promise II, reducing Iran’s long-range radar surveillance capability.

During this period, the Israeli air force sharply increased its activity, adopting a routine and predictable pattern that lowered the sensitivity of Iran’s early-warning network. The operation was launched precisely at a time when part of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ missile force, along with the joint air defense units of the Army and the IRGC, was committed to an annual military exercise.

This complex operation was designed around the doctrine of systemic shock—delivering a precise and sudden blow aimed at causing organizational psychological collapse and disrupting the command-and-control network. Within the framework of “Rising Lion,” multiple sub-operations were planned: the targeted assassination of senior IRGC commanders, including Martyrs Hossein Salami, Mohammad Bagheri, Amir Hajizadeh, and Gholamali Rashid, under an operation codenamed “Red Wedding.” In a separate operation known as “Narnia,” attacks were carried out in Tehran against several scientists linked to the nuclear program, as well as their family members.

In this battle, the Israeli regime pursued three main objectives. The first step was to neutralize Iran’s air defense capabilities by destroying early-warning radars, air bases, and surface-to-air missile systems, thereby opening the way for subsequent phases. The next goal was to deliver a heavy blow to Iran’s nuclear program. These attacks—carried out with the direct involvement of the United States and within the framework of Operation Midnight Hammer—targeted facilities such as Fordow, Natanz, the Isfahan Nuclear Research Center, and the unfinished Khondab reactor.

At the same time, efforts were underway to weaken Iran’s missile capabilities by destroying ballistic missile production centers and storage depots. After Israel’s experience of vulnerability to missile strikes during the True Promise operations, this had become a vital priority for the Israeli regime. Nevertheless, even these intense attacks failed to prevent Iran’s retaliatory response.

Less than three hours after the first wave of Israeli strikes, the drone arm of the IRGC Aerospace Force launched the initial wave of counterattacks at around 6:00 a.m. Dozens of long-range suicide drones were dispatched toward targets in the Occupied Territories.

By the evening of June 13, coinciding with the first address by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Iran carried out its first missile strike at around 9:30 p.m. local time. This was merely a prelude to 22 large-scale missile waves launched over the 12 days of war between Iran and the Israeli regime.

Unlike Iran’s previous operations, these missiles targeted a much broader range of objectives. In its two earlier missile operations, Iran had deliberately sought to focus exclusively on military targets—particularly Israeli air force bases.

However, the wide scope of the Israeli regime’s attacks went beyond military sites, encompassing nuclear facilities, government buildings, hospitals, residential homes, and urban areas, thereby significantly expanding the boundaries of the conflict.

In Iran’s capital, medical centers including Hakim Children’s Hospital, Children’s Hospital, Hazrat Fatemeh Women’s and Maternity Hospital, Shahid Mostafa Khomeini Hospital, Shahid Motahari Burn and Trauma Hospital, and Labbafi Nejad Hospital, as well as Farabi Hospital in Kermanshah, were among the healthcare facilities that suffered serious damage during the Israeli strikes.

In addition, nine ambulances and six emergency response bases were damaged. The Hoveyzeh Emergency Base and a health center in Kermanshah that provided care for pregnant women and newborns were completely destroyed. As a result of these attacks, six doctors, four nurses, and four Red Crescent personnel were martyred.

The attacks on non-military targets, particularly apartments and residential homes, not only resulted in the martyrdom of commanders, scientists, and their families but also targeted large numbers of civilian citizens. According to statistics from Iran’s Ministry of Health and Medical Education, around 700 civilians were martyred and more than 5,000 were injured in these attacks. Among the martyrs were at least 49 women and 13 children.

In a separate incident, during the course of the war, the Israeli regime attempted to bomb a confidential meeting of Iranian politicians from the Supreme National Security Council, including the President and the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament.

This development led Iran, in its defensive strategy, to target not only military and security installations but also government and infrastructure sites, some of which were located within urban areas. Although Iran has not released exact figures on the number of projectiles fired, Hebrew sources reported the launch of over 500 ballistic missiles—estimates ranging from 574 to 631 missiles, equivalent to an average of 40 to 52 launches per day.

With the onset of Iran’s missile strikes, the military censorship department of the Israeli army—part of the army’s intelligence branch (AMAN)—undertook strict measures to censor news, control information, and restrict the release of images showing the missile attacks and their consequences in both official and unofficial media.

Nevertheless, the limited images and information that were made public indicate that Iran’s targets can be categorized into three main types: military-security, economic-infrastructure, and residential areas. Below, we examine the most significant targets in each category.

Section one: Military-security targets
Camp Rabin – Kirya – Tel Aviv

Multiple news reports on the first wave of Iranian missile strikes indicate that a site in central Tel Aviv was targeted. This site, Camp Rabin, formerly known as Matkal-128, consists of five main sections: the General Staff Tower, which houses the operations of the Israeli army’s general staff and ministry of war; Marganit Tower, serving as the administrative building of the general staff and the communications center; the Canary Towers, hosting military offices including the Air Force Headquarters; Building-22, known as the Shimon Peres House, used by the ministry of war and the prime minister’s Office; and finally, the underground High Command Post, known as the “Pit” or “Zion Fortress,” which the general staff uses during emergencies.

Based on images released on the night of the attack, at least one location within this complex was hit. Additionally, live reports at the time of the strike indicated that the Israeli ministry of war was also targeted.

Tel Nof Airbase – Kiryat Ekron – Rehovot

Tel Nof Airbase, also known as Airbase No. 8, hosts Squadrons 106 and 133 (F-15C/D fighters), Squadrons 114 and 118 (CH-53K/D helicopters), Squadron 210 (Eitan reconnaissance-strike drones), Squadron 5601 (Flight Test Center), Unit 555 (Airborne Electronic Warfare Center), Unit 669 (Search and Rescue), and Unit 888 (Special Forces).

According to images released by the Israeli army, fighter jets based at this base participated in air attacks against Iran during Operation Days of Repentance and Operation Rising Lion. Satellite imagery of Tel Nof received on July 12, 2025, shows that during Iran’s missile strikes in the 12-day war, at least four structures in the central part of the base were damaged or destroyed.

A detailed review of these images also indicates that the base’s residential housing area was targeted during Iran’s True Promise II missile strike, with at least eight buildings destroyed, which are now undergoing reconstruction.

In the satellite image above, the targeted areas of Tel Nof Airbase are highlighted. In this image, red zones indicate targets hit during the 12-day war, while orange zones show areas struck during True Promise II.

Camp Glilot – Herzliya – North Tel Aviv

The Glilot camps in northern Tel Aviv, located at the Glilot junction in Herzliya and covering an area of about 2 square kilometers, house the main base of Unit 8200 of the Israeli army’s intelligence branch (AMAN). The complex includes Herzog Camp (home to the Military Intelligence Administration School), Dayan Camp (housing military colleges), and the Intelligence Heritage and Fallen Personnel Memorial Center, located east of the Ayalon Highway at the Glilot junction.

West of this highway, opposite the Glilot camps, stands the Mossad building. According to images released from Iran’s missile strikes on June 17 targeting northern Tel Aviv, at least one missile hit a warehouse within the Glilot camp area. Although the Israeli regime attempted to prevent news of this incident through military censorship, initial images from the site of the strike—showing a sign with the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate’s emblem—confirmed that the targeted area belonged to AMAN.

Weizmann Institute of Science – Rehovot – South Tel Aviv

The Weizmann Institute, a research-focused center, operates in various fields including mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, and biochemistry. In addition to its academic research, the institute participates in certain scientific projects linked to military technology companies. These projects include dual-use technologies (such as sensor development, imaging systems, and remote sensing) and the ULTRASAT satellite project, jointly developed by Elbit Systems, the Israeli Aerospace Organization, and the Weizmann Institute.

Two days after Israel’s airstrikes on Iran, during Iran’s missile attacks on June 15 targeting central areas of the Occupied Territories, reports emerged that the Weizmann Institute had been targeted.

Images and news reports released the following morning indicated the destruction of two buildings within the Weizmann Institute and damage to its laboratories. Satellite imagery of the institute shows direct hits by Iranian ballistic missiles on two buildings: Ulman Building (used for biology) and the New Chemistry Building, which had been under construction since 2021.

Blast effects were also observed on at least four other buildings, including the Isaac Wolfson Building, Wolfson Building, Loki Facilities, and the Moscowitz Building. This center was likely targeted in response to Israeli strikes against the Organization for Defensive Research and Innovation of Iran (SPAND).

According to published reports, Iran’s missile strike on the Weizmann Institute not only destroyed two buildings but also damaged 112 buildings across the campus, including 52 residential buildings and 60 laboratory buildings. Among the damaged structures, five buildings require full reconstruction, and 52 research laboratories along with six service laboratories were destroyed. The damage forced the institute to suspend one-fifth to one-fourth of its operations and resulted in material losses estimated between $450 and $600 million.

In the satellite image above, the two buildings directly hit by Iranian ballistic missiles are highlighted in red, while surrounding buildings affected by the blast waves are shown in orange, indicating varying levels of damage.

Section two: Economic-infrastructure targets
Haifa Oil Refinery

Following an Israeli airstrike on the Shahran oil depot in northern Tehran on June 14, Iran retaliated with a missile strike on the Haifa Oil Refinery on June 16. Previously owned by the ICL Group, the refinery was transferred to the Bazaan Petrochemical Group in September 2022. According to 2024 data, Bazaan supplies 65% of the diesel fuel needed for Israeli transportation, 59% of the gasoline consumed, and 52% of the jet fuel used by the Israeli air fleet.

During the Iranian strike, at least three points within the Haifa refinery were targeted. Reports indicate that the attack resulted in the death of three refinery employees and delayed the facility’s return to operation until October. Hebrew sources estimated the damage at $150–200 million, of which only $48 million was covered as an advance payment by the compensation fund.

Ramat Gan Twin Towers – Tel Aviv

The Ramat Gan Twin Towers are among several commercial buildings in Tel Aviv’s Diamond Exchange District and are primarily used for commercial purposes. During Iran’s missile strike on June 19, the Ramat Gan Diamond Exchange area—particularly the vicinity of the Twin Towers—was targeted. According to news reports, at least one building was destroyed, and nearby structures, including the Twin Towers themselves, were damaged by the blast waves.

Section three: Residential areas

An examination of the areas struck by Iranian ballistic missiles during the 12-day war shows that residential neighborhoods were among the locations impacted. One of the main reasons these areas were targeted was Iran’s reliance on its older-generation ballistic missiles. This limitation arose because western Iranian bases, which host the country’s new solid-fuel missiles, were non-operational, forcing Iran to depend heavily on its older liquid-fuel missiles for the strikes.

Iran’s liquid-fuel missiles, primarily developed from the Shahab missile family and extensively used in this war in the Ghadr and Emad versions, have a larger circular error probable (CEP) compared to solid-fuel ballistic missiles from the Kheibar Shekan and Fattah families. Although these missiles employ GPS/GNSS-based guidance systems, their accuracy can be significantly affected by electronic warfare and navigation system jamming during the terminal phase, as the reentry vehicles (RV/MaRV) re-enter the atmosphere, resulting in greater targeting errors.

The inherent inaccuracy of Iran’s ballistic missiles, combined with the placement of certain Israeli military and security sites near kibbutzim, urban areas, and densely populated residential neighborhoods, was a key reason why some missiles struck residential areas. For example, anti-ballistic missile launchers were deployed near Camp Rabin in the Hachariya area at the center of Tel Aviv. Satellite and other images from the first wave of Iranian missile strikes on the evening of June 13—which showed at least one confirmed impact—clearly reveal the launchers positioned within central Tel Aviv, within or adjacent to residential zones.

11-story Bat Yam Building – Tel Aviv

On the night of June 15, central areas of the Occupied Territories, including Tel Aviv, were targeted by Iranian ballistic missiles. During the strike on Bat Yam in southern Tel Aviv, an 11-story building along with a 4-story building in the area were hit by Iranian missiles, resulting in at least seven fatalities. Satellite imagery of the targeted area, received on July 12, clearly shows the destruction and damage to the affected buildings.

Neve Yam district – Bat Yam – Tel Aviv

The Neve Yam residential area in Rishon LeZion, south of Tel Aviv, was among the locations targeted by Iranian missile strikes on the night of June 14. With a population exceeding 250,000, Rishon LeZion was the fifth-largest Israeli city as of 2023.

Based on images released from the June 14 strikes and satellite imagery received on July 12, two buildings in Neve Yam were completely destroyed by direct hits from Iranian ballistic missiles, and their structures have since been cleared. News images also indicate that at least 11 additional buildings in the area suffered varying degrees of damage from the blast waves of the Iranian missiles.

One of the standout features of the war was the unexpected mix of Iran’s ballistic missiles. Most launches relied on liquid-fuel missiles and older generations, particularly the Ghadr and Emad systems. These were derived from the Shahab‑3 platform: the Ghadr family, featuring a simple separable warhead, was unveiled in 2009, while the Emad missile, equipped with a guided separable warhead, was introduced in 2015. A further optimized variant was presented in 2024.

Compared with more modern systems such as Haj Qassem and Kheibar Shekan, these missiles have a larger physical size, lower accuracy, slower speeds, and a higher margin of error, making them easier for the adversary to intercept.

This challenge emerged at a time when Iran’s modern missile stockpiles were largely deployed at bases in the western, southwestern, and northwestern regions. Drawing on previous experience, the Israeli regime repeatedly targeted missile bases in the border provinces of West Azarbaijan, Lorestan, Kermanshah, and Khuzestan, which together host more than ten bases containing modern missile inventories.

Continuous aerial patrols by Israeli aircraft enabled the detection and targeting of launchers, as well as efforts to damage tunnel entrances and logistical routes. Although the underground sections of these facilities largely remained intact, damage to the access points effectively trapped the underground areas, limiting their operational use.

In practice, after the fourth day, the main burden of the missile campaign shifted to central and northern bases in the provinces of Isfahan, Tehran, Fars, and Qazvin, which were generally equipped with long‑range but older missile systems. Only a limited number of modern missiles, such as Kheibar Shekan‑2 and Haj Qassem, were employed, and with great caution.

This approach involved the simultaneous launch of liquid‑fuel ballistic missiles to saturate air defenses, alongside the selective use of advanced solid‑fuel missiles against specific high‑value targets.

While Iran was unable to fully utilize its capabilities, the Israeli anti-ballistic network had been strengthened to an unprecedented level. During the conflict, the United States and Israel demonstrated extensive cooperation in intelligence, command, operations, and integrated missile defense.

As Israeli interceptor stocks dwindled under the heavy Iranian missile attacks, Tel Aviv’s reliance on U.S. defense systems increased. Estimates indicate that the U.S. fired over 230 ballistic missile interceptors to defend Israeli targets. During this period, Israel’s multi-layered defense shield included exo-atmospheric interceptors such as Standard-3, Arrow-3, THAAD, as well as endo-atmospheric interceptors like Arrow-2 and Standard-6.

The heavy cost the United States incurred in expending its limited ballistic missile interceptors highlighted the critical role of the U.S. missile defense shield in supporting Israel. Providing backing for Israel’s advanced but limited defense systems was one of the key factors in the Iran-Israel war, as Israeli interception capabilities nearly doubled in a short period.

Estimates indicate that Israel can simultaneously launch up to 100 Arrow anti-ballistic missiles; mobile launchers and reinforced concrete shelters at four known sites—Palmachim, Ein Shemer, Tal Shahar, and Eilat—allow this capability without the need for reloads.

The United States also deployed two THAAD batteries to support Israel: the first battery in southern Kiryat Gat before the end of October 2024, and the second battery near Nevatim Airbase in April 2025. Each THAAD battery is equipped with 6 launchers and 48 interceptors, with the ability to expand up to 9 launchers.

According to the Wall Street Journal, during the 12-day conflict, over 150 THAAD interceptors and approximately 80 Standard-3 missiles were fired—equivalent to the entire stock of three THAAD batteries.

It is claimed that out of approximately 574 ballistic missiles fired by Iran, Israel attempted to intercept 257 missiles. Of these, 201 interceptions were reportedly successful, 20 were partially successful, and 36 failed. Meanwhile, the impact of Iranian missiles on Israeli territory was subject to strict censorship.

The near future could present significant opportunities for Iran. These opportunities can be framed in terms of revising military tactics, rebuilding industrial infrastructure related to missile capabilities, streamlining existing systems, and bringing a new generation of weapons into the operational cycle. However, these capabilities will only reach their maximum effectiveness if accompanied by the reconstruction of the air defense network and air defense forces.

By contrast, the recovery and restoration of Israel’s anti‑ballistic capabilities will be a costly and time‑consuming process, one that could, in the medium term, shift the balance of deterrence in Iran’s favor.

According to official statements by senior Iranian officials, including Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the Supreme Leader’s representative and former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, former commander of the IRGC Air Force and current Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Iran had no direct wartime experience with Israel prior to April 2024.

Accordingly, Operation True Promise I represents Iran’s first operational experience confronting Israeli air defense systems directly. From the perspective of Iran’s high command, while the operation was technically valuable, its operational effectiveness was deemed unsatisfactory. During this operation, over 150 drones and 100 ballistic missiles were launched simultaneously toward targets deep within Israeli territory.

However, the marked differences in the flight profiles of these systems—9 to 10 hours for drones, around 2.5 hours for cruise missiles, and only 12 to 20 minutes for ballistic missiles—made precise temporal coordination between attack waves highly challenging.

This experience was directly incorporated into the design of subsequent operations, namely True Promise II and True Promise III. In these later phases, the IRGC missile command adopted greater tactical autonomy and staggered launch timing, successfully increasing hit rates and improving penetration of the Israeli defense systems.

It appears that a significant portion of Iran’s strategic assets was deliberately held in reserve. Long-range ballistic missiles such as Sejil, Khorramshahr‑3, and Khorramshahr‑4, the Shahid‑238 quasi-cruise drones, and surface-to-surface cruise missiles like Abu Mahdi and Paveh remained in the arsenal.

Given that there were no range limitations in targeting deep within Israeli territory, this decision reflects deterrence considerations and the intent to preserve capabilities for potential future phases of the conflict. The Khorramshahr missile family, among Iran’s newest ballistic achievements, features modern navigation subsystems, advanced flight control systems, and a design optimized to overcome multi-layered missile defenses. Their non-use during the recent 12-day war can thus be interpreted as a strategic reserve maintained for future engagements.

During the course of the war, a number of facilities linked to solid‑fuel production, explosives manufacturing, and parts of Iran’s missile‑program infrastructure were targeted by Israeli airstrikes. The key question is whether these attacks were capable of disrupting Iran’s ballistic missile production chain.

Visual evidence released by media outlets and independent analytical sources indicates that parts of Iran’s missile production process take place in hardened underground facilities. One notable example is the footage showing the Dezful ballistic missile assembly line, unveiled in February 2019. In practice, this makes the complete destruction of Iran’s missile production chain impossible given Israel’s current capabilities.

It appears that the relocation of missile production lines underground is likely to accelerate in the future. Although producing fuel and explosives in underground facilities presents significant challenges, in the medium term this trend is expected to work to Iran’s advantage.

In the event of a disruption to production, estimates suggest that Iran’s existing stockpiles would be sufficient to sustain several consecutive rounds of conflict. In particular, Kheibar Shekan and Fattah missiles, which use solid‑fuel propulsion and feature quasi‑hypersonic characteristics, are considered highly challenging for ballistic missile defense systems and are believed to have played a role in the destruction of the Haifa refinery.

It is estimated that a significant portion of these stockpiles remained intact at bases in western Iran and have since been dispersed and redeployed across central regions of the country.

By contrast, the defensive costs borne by the Israeli regime in a similar conflict are assessed as staggering and nearly unsustainable. Although exact figures on Israeli interceptor stockpiles remain classified, U.S. officials have described the situation as critical. According to a Financial Times report dated 15 October 2024, Israel faces a serious risk of running short of interceptor missiles.

Dana Stroul, former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East, stated that Israel’s munitions situation is extremely serious. Meanwhile, the CEO of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) acknowledged that interceptor missile production lines are operating around the clock in three shifts and at maximum capacity, merely to replace a portion of the missiles already expended.

The situation in the United States is also far from favorable. By 2025, only about 900 Talon interceptor missiles have been produced by Lockheed Martin. Of these, 192 were delivered to the UAE and 50 to Saudi Arabia.

Out of the remaining 658 missiles held by the United States, around 25 were expended during exercises and nearly 150 were fired in the recent conflict. This means that U.S. operational stocks have fallen to fewer than 500 interceptors, and in practice one quarter of America’s eight operational batteries were devoted solely to the Occupied Territories.

The United States will receive only 12 new interceptors this year and just 37 more in 2026. Even at full annual production capacity of 100 missiles, replenishing depleted stockpiles would take more than 18 months, potentially disrupting foreign deliveries, including Saudi Arabia’s order of 360 missiles.

It should also be noted that the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system fired around 80 SM‑3 interceptor missiles during this conflict, at a time when only about 398 of these missiles had been delivered to the U.S. Navy by 2024.

Between 2023 and January 2025, more than 400 interceptors were used to counter Yemen's Ansarullah drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. This total includes 120 SM‑2 missiles, around 80 SM‑6 missiles, 20 SM‑3 interceptors, and a number of ESSMs.

Taking into account the use of 12 SM‑3 missiles in Operation True Promise 2 and 80 missiles in True Promise 3, approximately 23% of the total SM‑3 stockpile has now been expended. With a range of 700 to 900 kilometers, these missiles are among the few defensive tools available to the United States against intercontinental nuclear ballistic missiles.

In any future conflict, if the United States is unable to maintain an effective missile defense umbrella over the Occupied Territories, the damage inflicted on the Israeli regime would be several times greater and potentially devastating.